

De-Radicalization Within Kenya Prison

¹Nick Chemosit William, ²Collins Powel Manana

¹PhD Candidate, Department of Public Policy and Administration, Kenyatta University

²PhD student Department of Psychology, University of South Africa

Corresponding Email: chemosit@gmail.com

How to cite this article: William, N. C., & Manana, C. P. (2023). De-Radicalization Within Kenya Prison. *Journal of Public Policy and Governance*, 3(2), 1-11.

Abstract

This paper discusses the de-radicalization within prisons in Kenya. Before de-radicalization programs are discussed in detail, definition and process of radicalization is introduced first. The programs bring positive impacts to society at large. This paper also looked at global de-radicalization where countries like Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Iraq and Egypt were found out to have different kinds of de-radicalization programs. However, there are some similarities in the approach used by the four countries through counselling programs that emphasized on communication between the terrorist and psychologist. Various factors contributed in the involvement in terrorism based on the result. ‘Treating unkind persons with kindness generally produces better results than treating them likewise or worse’. By treating terrorists and those attracted to terrorism on the humane standards than terrorists treat their prisoners and adversaries, to some extent. In as much as the government of Kenya has affected de-radicalization programs within the prisons, there are some hurdles associated with it which include lack of transparency and accountability by the government agencies, hence the study recommends that there should be a clear channel in ensuring that such programs are well implemented to reduce radicalization within Kenya.

Keywords: *De-radicalization, prisons, radicalization, terrorists, violent extremism*

1.0 Introduction

Radicalization refers to a change in beliefs, feelings, and behaviors that justify intergroup violence and the demand for sacrifice in defending the own group. Bott et al. (2009). U.K.'s Home Office, in its CONTEST counterterrorism strategy, refers to radicalization as: “The process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to join terrorist.

Violent extremism is often used to refer to ideologies that oppose societal principles and values and justify the use of violence to advocate particular beliefs – including racial, religious, or political (Neumann, 2011). This is supported in the book Homegrown Violent Extremism, where Southers (2013) explains that there is “a broad range of ideologies and factions” around VE, and that ideological motivations include race, religion, and issue motivation (Southers, 2013, p. 22). Similarly, it further explained that Violent extremism is ‘violence in the absence of reason, or rather, the belief that committing an act of violence will produce benefits that outweigh the cost of human life. Violent extremism is homicide, genocide, fratricide, and, yes, it can also be terrorism’. According to Mroz (2009b), whilst terrorism can be countered, violent

extremism cannot, as most forms of violent extremism are undertaken as ‘lone wolf attacks’ (whether as a one-off operation or as an operation undertaken by one individual).

De-radicalization refers to psychological changes, in the areas of cognition, emotion, motivation, and values, “long-lasting change in orientation such that there is presumably a reduced risk of re-engaging in terrorist activity” (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). Further, a goal of risk-reduction, Dechesne states that “Deradicalization pertains to the disappearance of radical thoughts, not just radical behavior”. Rabasa *et al.* (2010), take this one step further in their definition, adding the importance of adhering to the thoughts or values of the mainstream: “De-radicalization is the process of changing an individual’s belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology, and embracing mainstream values”.

Radicalization and violent extremism have emerged to be global issue since it has been seen in various continents of the world by both developed and developing nations. Previous documentation has synchronized that ‘Extremism can flourish only in an environment where basic governmental social responsibility for the welfare of the people is neglected’ (Bhutto, 2014). The threat of terrorism is now felt in Europe, America, Africa, and Asia and whilst there are regional peculiarities, it must be noted that the rise in terrorism and radical extremism is truly a global concern (El-Said, 2012).

Prisons, then, are often regarded as breeding grounds for radicalization. This is not surprising, given that a typical prison population will comprise greater numbers of identity and protection seekers, rebels, who are psychologically inclined to succumb to approaches made by terrorists towards them. For a terrorist wishing to radicalize others, prisons provide near-perfect conditions in which radical, religiously framed ideologies can flourish (ICSR, 2010). Whilst the number of terrorists and the number of terrorist-related incidents increases globally, so does the number of terrorists who are caught and imprisoned. This has an impact on the cognitive processes in instances where they feel neglected and terrorism offers a sense of identity as well as the promise of high returns (Kahara, 2017).

According to Angell (2011), prisons have the potential to become ideal breeding grounds for radicalization and terrorism; they not only allow extremists to develop violent ideology but provide a favorable setting in which proselytization efforts can be set in motion. Odhiambo (2016) explained that deficiencies in individual identity create vulnerability; individuals in search of their identity have been seen as easy targets for radicalization.

The role of the family in a person’s early development was highlighted by Botha (2014) in her thesis on the role socialization plays in later vulnerability, as well as weakened family structures, which according to Villa-Vicencio et al. (2016), further contribute to radicalization, particularly amongst the youth. The lack of solid authority within families renders young people vulnerable to radicalization and makes it difficult for families to intervene against radicalization. radicalization in prisons is a major challenge in Kenya and is on the rise. Al-Shabaab is exploiting Kenya’s ill-run prisons and turning them into recruitment grounds (Angira, 2016).

Violent extremism is also dynamic and extremist groups aptly identify new opportunities that will further their agenda. One such opportunity relates to gender dynamics which present women as valuable players in violent extremism. Extremist groups are increasingly targeting women for recruitment owing to their lower visibility as terrorists, their strong influence on their sons, and their role as wives of terrorists. Preventing radicalization into violent extremism requires addressing the socioeconomic challenges and pressures that exist in vulnerable

societies such as marginalized areas and people subjected to rough conditions such as prisons (Kahara, 2017).

2.0 Global Radicalization Within Prison

Throughout history, there have been notable examples of prisons not only acting as recruitment centers but also headquarters for religious and ideological extremists. Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin used their time behind bars to develop and refine their extremist ideologies, as have key figures in the shaping of modern jihadist thought such as Sayyid Qutb and Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi (Brandon, 2009). Adolf Hitler wrote his book *Mein Kampf*, (German: “My Struggle”) political manifesto while imprisoned following his failed coup in Munich in November 1923 and a trial in February 1924 for high treason, he was sentenced to five years. It was his only complete book, and the work became the bible of National Socialism (Nazism) in Germany’s Third Reich (*mein kampf* work by Hitler 1943). Joseph Stalin was in Batumi Prison and then Kutaisi Prison, in mid-1903 he was sentenced to three years of exile in eastern Siberia where he studied Esperanto, then regarding it as the language of the future (Ronald Grigor, 2020).

Richard Colvin Reid known as a shoe bomber at the age of 16, left high school and spent most of his 20s as a petty criminal, in and out of jail like his father. In 1995, Richard converted to Islam while in jail. When he was released one year later, he joined the Brixton Mosque and formed his first connections with prominent radical Islamic figures. He later joined the community of Finsbury Park Mosque which was known for its anti-American and anti-western radical views. In 1999, Richard went to Pakistan and Afghanistan, where he trained in a terrorist camp and became a member of al-Qaeda and a Mujahidin (Avraham Jager, 2018).

Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) (sometimes spelled Sayed and Qutub or Kotb) was one of the leading Islamist ideologues of the 20th century who was radicalized in prison. In 1954 he was imprisoned along with other members of the Muslim Brothers and remained in prison for ten years. Qutb was allowed to write, however, and his writings from prison became increasingly radical and even revolutionary, claiming that all so-called Muslim societies were anti-Islamic (*jahili*). It is generally held that the harsh treatment he and others suffered in prison was a major factor in this development (William Shepherd, 2019).

Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi (born Isam Muhammad Tahir Al-Barqawi) is a Jordanian-Palestinian Salafi leader who became a mentor for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi-the founder of Al-Qaeda in Iraq- while they were in prison together. Zarqawi grew up in Zarqa, Jordan, which is also near a Palestinian refugee camp. He grew up in lower-income neighborhood he was a thug and was in and out of prison. It was rumored that he had worked as a pimp. He led a very different life initially growing up, as a teenager in his twenties, and eventually ends up being in a cellblock with Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, who become his spiritual leader, his guidance. That’s when he first started to become radicalized (Wana Institute, 2017).

In Kenya, Shimo La Tewa and Kamiti Maximum Security Prisons have the biggest population of inmates associated with terror offenses, creating serious security concerns within the penal system. Hundreds of them have been convicted of engaging in various terrorist activities, promoting radicalization and violent take-overs of mosques, especially in the Coast region (GCCS, 2021).

Jermaine Grant who is in Shimo Latewa prison is an associate of Samantha Lewthwaite also known as “white widow.” suspected to be the mastermind behind the Westgate and Garissa University killings that claimed over 200 people. Grant became radicalized as a teenager when he was in prison with British terrorist Richard Reid famously known as the shoe bomber (Shimo la Tewa Monitor, 2016). It is suspected that Grant has been flipping the script of

Richard RIED in Kenya by radicalizing prisoners in prison. He has been targeting young, first-time offenders for indoctrination.

Elgiva Bwire Oliach who is also known as Seif Deen Mohamed while serving his prison term, maintained close contacts with radical cells in Kenya and Somalia and was actively seeking to recruit young men. He was the head of a local cell known as the al Ghuraba that carried out attacks in Nairobi, targeting patrons in bars, passengers at stages, and security personnel. One police officer in Kenya claimed they had received reports Elgiva promised his former friends who are serving various charges of terrorism at Kamiti Maximum Prison that he will stage an attack to free them immediately after being released (Tarus, the Star Nov 2021). After the release of Elgiva Bwire, it alleged that he facilitated the escape of Mohamed Ali Abikar, Joseph Juma Odhiambo, and Musharaf Abdalla Akhulunga from Kamiti prison Who were later arrested while trying to flee to Somalia

3.0 Global De-Radicalization

Existing prison programs administered across a variety of nations contain enviable protocols that enhance the rehabilitation process. Nations such as Denmark, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Algeria all have distinctive de-radicalization programs that cater to unique cultural and social conditions. For example, Saudi Arabia and Singapore emphasize re-educating inmates on their understanding of Islam as congruent with the program's central tenet of changing previous attitudes and beliefs (Rabasa et al., 2010). Whereas the Aarhus model used in Denmark focuses more on reintegration, where a variety of social and community services play a key role in the rehabilitation process. These examples demonstrate the diversity of programs and approaches available for implementation both in corrective institutions and within the broader community.

In Saudi Arabia: A comprehensive counseling/education program is the heart of the Saudi program “designed to combat the intellectual and ideological justification for violent extremism”. The program uses intensive religious debates and psychological counseling. It is based on the belief that those recruited by terrorist groups often have little formal religious education. While they are in prison, they are encouraged to discuss and debate Islamic law with sheiks and scholars. This type of religious counseling seeks to correct the detainees' interpretation of Islam through open dialogue (Horgan, 2009). While the program begins in prison, it continues at the Care Rehabilitation Center, located in a former resort, just outside the capital city of Riyadh. A stay at the Center lasts up to six months and the prisoners participate in a wide variety of activities from Qu'ranic studies to art therapy. There is a swimming pool on the grounds and there are also opportunities for other recreational activities. The correctional staff do not wear uniforms and inmates have 24-hour access to telephones. After leaving the Care Rehabilitation Center, the Saudi government monitors the progress of the inmates and offers support. Christopher Boucek (2008) wrote in a study for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noting that “once an individual satisfactorily renounced his previous beliefs, assistance is provided in locating a job and receiving other benefits, including additional government stipends, a car, and an apartment. The success of the program is based in part on the recognition that being a radical is not inherently a bad thing. Acting on radical beliefs with violence, however, is, and that it is the behavior that needs to be modified.”

In Singapore: With 16% of its prison inmates being Muslims, Singapore established the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) to de-radicalize jihadi terrorists. Nearly 40 Islamic scholars and religious leaders make up a group dedicated to “deprogramming” detainees. By approaching the jihadists on religious terms, the RRG seeks to treat the problem at its root. As

one security officer explained, “Once you take an oath to God, it will take another man of God to undo it.” (Seifert, 2010). Singapore is also home to the Behavioral Sciences Unit’s (BSU), Home Team Academy, which conducts research into terrorism and develops programs to counter violent extremism. The BSU, in addition to its research, holds conferences and publishes books, newsletters, and practical guides for academics and practitioners (Gary Hill, 2020).

In Iraq: The Munasaha 25 program began on 9 March 2011, with the aim to rehabilitate prisoners in Anbar and Baghdad. Much like the Saudi program, it was designed to educate inmates about the damage terrorism caused to Iraqi society and was meant to make them realize that terrorism violates the law and is considered a sin by all religions (Gary Hill, 2020). Task Force 134, the US unit charged with overseeing coalition detainee operations in Iraq, utilized an approach of segregating extremists, nurturing moderates, and ensuring good care and custody for each detainee. Beginning with a classification process to separate recruiters from other inmates the program included religious discussions conducted by US-vetted Iraqi imams, basic literacy education, and work programs. According to US authorities, the education component was particularly effective (Azarva, 2009).

In Egypt: the program of terrorist rehabilitation began already in May 1997. At that time, the leadership of a-Gama’a al-Islamiya took the initiative to denounce the use of violence in jihad (except for self-defense). In November 2007, al-Jihad al-Islamiya adopted the de-radicalization model established by a-Gama’a al-Islamiya. Although the Egyptian security authorities were initially skeptical and hesitant to support the inmate-initiated program, they later came to accept and support it. The leadership of a-Gama’a al-Islamiya, after consulting with Islamic scholars from Al-Azhar University, released 25 volumes of revisions to their initial doctrines, entitled Tashih al-Mafahim. The revisions included the recognition that Islam does not permit killing or terrorizing non-Muslim civilians and discussed the dangers that Al-Qaeda poses to Muslims worldwide.

4.0 Radicalization Theorists

HORGAN: Horgan indicates that six key risk factors are involved in leading individuals to engage in acts of extremism: (Horgan, 2012): Being exposed to certain levels of emotional vulnerability which may include feelings of alienation, anger, or disenfranchisement. This state has often been linked to the search for spiritual guidance or being culturally displaced; Dissatisfaction and/or disappointment with the contemporary method of protest to produce political/social change; Identification and empathy shown toward the suffering of Muslims; A mindset that condones violence against a nation-state and the symbols with which the nation-state identify; The possibility of gaining reward from joining certain groups or social movements that may be physical or symbolic. Connections to people associated with terrorism/extremist organizations.

MOGHADDAM: Staircase of Terrorism; Ground floor: ‘Psychological interpretation of material conditions’ (Bongar, 2007). Acquiring a degree of predisposition towards terrorism via Subjective perceptions of deprivation, injustice blocked social mobility, and Perceived threats to their identity – antagonized by increasing globalization and Westernization. This is the most ‘foundational’ floor, presumably with the largest number of inhabitants due to widespread perceptions of relative deprivation and injustice. First floor: ‘Perceived options to fight unfair treatment’. Those on the first floor have a perception of Blocked social mobility and exclusion from political decision-making, which generates a sense of injustice at the

illegitimacy of existing procedures and systems of rules ‘Displaced aggression’, whereby others are blamed for their perceived problems.

Second floor: ‘Displacement of aggression’ This floor is characterized by displaced aggression, often verbalized rather than expressed through violent action. There is little by way of explanation for the transition to the third floor except the conscious seeking of ways to take physical action. Third floor: ‘Moral engagement’ The role of the terrorist organization emerges on the third floor, where training and ‘moral engagement’ occur, with a narrative to persuade the individual that its ends justify its means in achieving an ‘ideal society’. Employing tactics of “isolation, affiliation, secrecy, and fear” acts to encourage and maintain this moral disengagement.

Fourth floor: ‘Categorical thinking and the perceived legitimacy of the terrorist organization’. Climbing to the fourth floor is to fully enter the terrorist organization where recruits are socialized and assimilated into the secret life of the terrorist cell. The group promotes categorical “us versus them” dichotomous thinking, and the clandestine mission fosters increasing isolation from the wider society. Moghaddam describes how pressures to conform and obey increase the likelihood of terrorist acts by members and narrow the options for leaving the group (Mogahaddam, 2005).

Fifth floor: ‘The terrorist act and sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms’ The fifth floor is the last step or operational phase, with recruits receiving the cognitive resources necessary to overcome natural inhibitory mechanisms required to kill others by Categorizing the target as ‘the enemy’, Exaggerating in-group and out-group differences, Preventing any inhibitory mechanisms that is allowing victims of the attack to become aware of the danger and thereby behave in a way that could change the attacker’s mind.

5.0 De-Radicalization Within Kenya Prisons

Programs to rehabilitate and de-radicalize terrorists are in operation in many countries, including Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the UK, the US, and Yemen. Such programs vary in terms of methods, support, and funding. For example, some countries like Egypt, Algeria, and Israel look at terrorists as a group whereas other countries like Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Afghanistan work with imprisoned terrorists on an individual basis. Another difference between correctional systems is whether to separate violent extremists from other inmates or integrate them. Israel has separate prisons or wings designated for “security prisoners”. The Netherlands has a “terrorism wing” in its Vught high-security prison for a small number of inmates classified as terrorists, whereas the United Kingdom and Spain disperse their terrorist prisoners and place them in any of their high-security prisons (Gray Hill, 2020).

Prisons provide an ideal location for state officials to implement procedures that can assist with the process of de-radicalization and rehabilitation; procedures which are designed to tackle the underlying causes that led to the radicalization of extremist individuals and induce a renunciation of their violent ideology (Drummond, 2002). Knowing how to deal with terrorists within the prison and how to reduce recidivism is very challenging. Typically, prison authorities are not properly equipped to deal with these challenges and so opportunities are missed to de-radicalize terrorists. This has been noted in several studies globally (Schneider, 2015). Kenya National Counter Terrorism Centre is a multi-agency institution established by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 to coordinate national counter-terrorism measures to prevent, detect,

deter, and disrupt terrorist acts. (NCTC Kenya) is yet to come up with specific frameworks that respond to the specific needs of the Kenyan prison services that suit local setups.

Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violence and Promote Peace, “that most young people are part of the solution working to build peace and prevent violent extremism,” and the majority of youth simply reject violence (Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism, 2015). It is therefore paramount to note that most youth are driven by economic difficulties towards being recruited by violent extremists. Odhiambo (2015) and Abdikadir (2016) found that dissatisfaction based on socioeconomic difficulties creates vulnerability and enables violent extremists to recruit individuals by providing economic incentives. Socio-economic discontent further erodes a sense of belonging and thrives under the notion that, according to Villa-Vicencio et al. (2016) “...when you have nothing, you have nothing to lose...”.

It is also worth noting that deradicalization can easily happen within Kenyan prisons if the government strengthens the policies whereby the influential leaders in the community disengage in activities that would fuel violent extremism. Also, political leaders should encourage oneness and discourage those activities that would lead to radicalization. This is because previously the key people in the societies were seen to be at the forefront of recruiting and encouraging members to engage in violent activities. According to Botha (2014), influential people in the community play a major role in the radicalization of individuals. For instance, religious leaders have been known to misuse religious texts to justify violent extremism thus encouraging followers to join extremist groups. Mazrui (2018), further highlighted those geopolitics have also contributed to violent extremism and those unresolved conflicts which sustain instability also create environments that are conducive to radicalization.

The government should be free from corruption since it has been noted that corrupt governments are a getaway to fueling violent extremism since this creates porous borders where people move freely from one country to the other for example Kenya and Somalia. The transnational nature of violent extremism requires inter-state movement and porous borders such as between Kenya and Somalia to further facilitate extremist activities. Rosenau in 2005 and Patterson (2015) explained that insufficient border control and immigration management, often as a result of corruption, provide a conducive environment for violent extremist groups to operate. Thus, countries with high levels of corruption become easy targets for such groups.

Technology has its advantages and disadvantages, but looking at violent extremism, technology has brought more harm than good since it has been seen to trigger violent extremism, recruits are added day in and day out due to the ease brought about by technology. Hence it is paramount to monitor the usage of technology in Kenyan prisons to solve radicalization. The advancement in technology has played a key role in furthering and actualizing the agenda of violent extremist groups. For instance, the internet had been used to recruit individuals and coordinate extremist activities from other countries. According to Odhiambo (2015), concerning Kenya, social media additionally facilitated easy access to young people enhancing their vulnerability to being recruited into violent extremist organizations. According to Patterson (2015) in addition to the use of technology to radicalize and recruit new members, a good transportation and communication network further facilitates the movement and communication of extremist groups, therefore enabling them to operate with ease.

The prison intelligence function seeks, through objective strategic and operationally driven planned information and data collection, to identify those prisoners, visitors, staff, and organizations planning to engage in an activity, or who are engaged in an activity that may be a threat to the good order, safety and security of a prison before a destructive event occurs.

Colaert (2017) studied de-radicalization focusing on scientific insights for policy. He pointed out that a challenge in designing and delivering effective counter-narrative campaigns in an online environment was that at times, the message or post source could be diluted.

Research demonstrates that access to formal education and work opportunities increasingly lower recidivism rates for prisoners (Bahn, 2011). The absence of meaningful personal relationships and a weak sense of community belonging play significantly into the radicalization process, yet their influence has been overlooked in several de-radicalization programs. Working towards lower rates of recidivism should give equal, if not more, weight to the engagement of a radicalized individual. A strong coordinated community and government effort that includes prisoner training, education, and engagement within prisons would significantly reduce recidivism and the chances of re-radicalization (Unodc, 2018).

6.0 Conclusion

When a person becomes imprisoned it is common for the individual to go through physical and emotional trauma that can make them more vulnerable to recruitment. For example, in the beginning, when an individual is placed in jail, acute and chronic stress factors can give rise to physical problems which can make the prisoner more impressionable and vulnerable. At this moment a recruiter can enter into contact with the new prisoner and evaluate their vulnerability and likeliness to conform to their extremist group. It is also common for incarcerated individuals to undergo unbalanced emotional states, such as states of discontentment-excitement: hate, anger, doubt, and states of discontent-relation: humiliation, fear, and sadness. This unbalanced emotional state is ideal for possible recruiters to infiltrate the minds of the vulnerable and impressionable.

Since de-radicalization is the process of changing an individual's belief system so that he or she rejects violent extremist ideology and embraces mainstream, non-violent values. It implies a fundamental change in understanding resulting from activities intended to help individuals renounce radical or extreme ideas, beliefs, and groups with a link to violence. It must be noted, however, that whilst prisons often act as breeding grounds for terrorists, they must also be seen as part of the potential 'solution' towards combating terrorism (Schneider, 2015). Hence there are some programs that the government has initiated to help curb radicalization. Interventions use a range of methods including mentoring, engagement with ideological or theological issues, help with employment and education, and social and psychological support.

The best weapon in the fight against the radicalization of prisoners and violent extremist inmates is well-trained staff especially staff using Dynamic Security (Shane Bryans, 2016). Dynamic Security is a concept and a working method by which staff prioritizes the start and maintenance of everyday communication and interaction with prisoners, based on professional ethics. It aims at better understanding prisoners and assessing the risks they may pose as well as ensuring safety, security, and good order, contributing to rehabilitation and preparation for release. This concept should be understood within a broader notion of security which also comprises structural, organizational, and static security. Nevertheless, from a correction officer's standpoint, if one is not sure, the best rule is "If you see something, say something." Correction officers should let the prison intelligence team know and also make sure the staff coming on to the next shift are informed about their observations of suspicious behavior and reasons for concern (Graham Hill, 2020).

Prisons have played an enormous role in the narratives of nearly every extremist and militant movement in recent years. Prisons are "places of vulnerability" in which radicalization can and does take place. Yet and this should not be forgotten some prison systems have also served as

incubators for rehabilitation and peaceful transformations. Dynamic Security is an important and effective tool assisting prison staff to recognize inmates who are vulnerable to radicalization. It can contribute to keeping them from becoming violent extremist inmates or from them joining terrorist organizations while still in prison or upon release. Omwega, Role, and Ndiku (2016) show that mentoring programs are core contributors to positive development among the youth who are vulnerable to radicalization. This is achieved by developing social connections with individuals who are leaders and role models in the community. Last but not least, the government of Kenya should channel more resources towards these de-radicalization programs since its advantages are more than the disadvantages. When we invest resources in intervention and deradicalization, we're achieving a couple of things. First of all, intervention, reintegration, and rehabilitation are much cheaper than long-term repression, arrests, and prisons.

7.0 Recommendations

1. There is a need for the formation of cell wings specifically dealing with terror-related inmates. And establish separation centers and have clear selection processes so that only those who pose the greatest security risk are selected. The operational policy should be written with instructions and Assessment should be an ongoing process throughout separation to identify whether the risk has reduced or increased. extra restrictions may be placed on some radical and violent extremist offenders, based on their behavior, risk assessment, and classification. Therefore, punitive measures, use of force, and means of restraint shall be proportionate to the direct and serious threats of disruption of good order, safety, and security in a given prison to preserve, to the extent possible, relations of trust and support in helping the reintegration of offenders.
2. The government of Kenya needs to train legal teams and judicial officials in dealing with terror-related cases, it needs to enhance legal and operational frameworks in counter-terrorism to strengthen criminal justice. Preventing and tackling radicalization and violent extremism should always be based on the rule of law and comply with international human rights standards because respect for human rights and the rule of law is an essential part of a successful counter-radicalization effort. Failure to comply with these is one of the factors which may contribute to increased radicalization.
3. Ministry of Interior needs to take care of the welfare of police officers and prison warders in terms of remuneration and motivation the working condition in police and prison cells should reflect the complexity and significance of their role in this respect. The process of radicalization in both prisons occurs when radicalizers can propagate violent ideologies to offenders who are not radicalized. Offenders and serving prison wardens become radicalized because of economic frustrations and the desire for a better life
4. The Ministry of the Interior in Kenya has to provide support, resources, training, safety, and supervision to staff at all levels who are working with radicalized suspects the training should be tailored according to local situations and scenarios. Torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ought to be prohibited. Freedom of expression and freedom of religion should be respected. Prison officers ought to review the lessons they have received in their basic training on international standards.
5. Teamwork involving prison officials in handling terror issues needs to be there; there is a need to recruit and retain highly competent, motivated, and experienced officers and multi-disciplinary teams to work in a prison comprehensive regime; Effective

cooperation between prisons, the probation service, police, intelligence agencies, and the judiciary need to be prioritized in minimizing the chances of offending and maximizing prisoner reintegration into society by becoming eligible citizens

6. Enhancement of the probation department which prepares and makes follow-up on terror convicts upon release to enable smooth integration back into society. Prison and probation staff need to be trained to recognize an individual association with any known extremist network or group. Prison and probation staff need adequate training to carry out their work efficiently and humanely and difference ate between radicalized offenders and those who simply practice their religion, culture or traditions (Unodc, 2016).
7. Proper use of intelligence information should be observed, while informants may provide information that may not otherwise be available to prison management, the use of informants in prison is particularly dangerous for the informant and is also open to possible abuse. Informants may have many different motivations.
8. Delivering effective counter-narrative campaigns. This affected the coherence in spreading the counter messages.

References

- Angel Rabasa, Stacie Pettyjohn, Jeremy Ghez & Christopher Boucek, ‘*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*’ (Research Report, RAND Corporation, 2010) 185.
- Angira, Z. (2016). *Kenya: terror recruitment thriving in prisons*, in <https://allafrica.com/stories/201606030576.html>, accessed on 23/03/2020
- Anneli Botha, “*Political Socialization and Terrorist Radicalization Among Individuals Who Joined Al-Shabaab in Kenya*,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 37 (November 2014): 904; HORN and CSCR, *Map-ping Dynamics and Perceptions of Violent Extremism A Study of Nature, Drivers and Perceptions of Muslim Women and Girls Towards Violent Extremism in Kenya* (HORN and CSCR) 12.
- Anneli Botha, *Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalization and Extremism* (ISS, 2013): 13; Alamin Mazrui et al, “*Global and Local Contexts of Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Kenya*,” in *Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: Between the Rule of Law and the Quest for Security*, ed. Alamin Mazrui et al (Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, 2018), 15
- Azarva, Jeffrey, ‘*Is U.S. Detention Policy in Iraq Working?*’ *Middle East Quarterly*, 16(1), Winter 2009, pp. 5-14.
- Boucek, Christopher, ‘*Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*,’ Washington, DC: Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, September 2008, p. 23.
- Briggs, R., & Feve, S. (2013). *Review of programs to counter narratives of violent extremism: What works and what are the implications for government?* London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
- Bruce Bongar, *Psychology of Terrorism* (Oxford University Press, 2007) 70.
- Colaert, L. (2017). *De-radicalization: Scientific insights for policy*. Brussels, Belgium: Flemish Peace Institute.

- Drummond, J. (2002). From Northwest Imperative to Global Jihad: *Social Psychological Aspect of the Construction of the Enemy, Political Violence, and Terror*. In C. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: A public understanding (psychological dimension to war and peace)* (Vol. III). Connecticut: Praeger.
- E.O.S Odhiambo et.al, “*Domestic Radicalisation in Kenya,*” *Global Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences* 4, no. 3 (May-June, 2015): 50; Villa-Vicencio Charles, et al, 2016:20)
- El-Said, H. &. (2012). Saudi Arabia: the master of deradicalization. In H. El-Said & J. Harrigan, *Deradicalizing violent extremists. Counter-radicalization and deradicalization programmes and their impact in Muslim majority states*. New York: Routledge.
- Fathali Moghaddam ‘*The Staircase of Terrorism*’ (2005) *American Psychologist* 162, 166.
- Global Forum on Youth, *Peace, and Security*. (2015). *The Amman Youth Declaration*. Amman, Jordan.
- Horgan, John, ‘*Individual Disengagement: a Psychological Analysis*’; in Bjorgo, Tore and John Horgan (eds.), *Leaving Terrorism Behind*. London and New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 27.
- Kahara, G. W. (2017). *Violent Extremism and Radicalization among Youth in Prisons: A Case of Langata Womens, Kamiti and Shimo La Tewa Prisons in Kenya* (Doctoral dissertation, United States International University-Africa).
- Osman Ali Abdikadir, *Youth Radicalization as a Tool for Terrorism in East Africa: A Case Study of Kenya*. (MA in International Studies diss., University of Nairobi, 2016), 9;
- Schneider, J. (2015, July). *Inside Boko Haram*. New African Magazine.
- Seifert, Katherine, ‘*Can Jihadists Be Rehabilitated?*’ *Middle East Quarterly*, 17(2), Spring 2010, pp. 21-30.
- Villa-Vicencio Charles, et al, *Community Perceptions of Violent Extremism in Kenya* (IJR, 2016), 18
- William R. Patterson, “*Islamic Radicalization in Kenya,*” *Joint Force Quarterly* 78 (July 2015): 17.