Contextual Limitations in Sandra Harding's Epistemological Framework and How They Can be Overcome
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.70619/vol4iss2pp46-52Keywords:
Androcentrism, Harding’s Epistemology, Standpoint, Contextual Limitation, Epistemology, Essentialism, Relativism, KnowledgeAbstract
This paper aims to investigate the contextual constraints in Sandra Harding's epistemology and suggest methods to get around them. The standpoint theory developed by Harding highlights the significance of taking historical, social, and cultural contexts into account when producing knowledge. This strategy essentializes and homogenizes various experiences and viewpoints. The study offers potential solutions to these constraints by critically examining the drawbacks of intersectionality and feminist standpoint theory. This entails embracing a more nuanced understanding of power dynamics, encouraging inclusive and diverse viewpoints, and acknowledging the complexities of multiple intersecting identities. The study aims to strengthen and enhance Harding's epistemology by addressing its contextual limitations and promoting a more equitable and inclusive approach to knowledge production. To achieve this goal, this study employs the laws of thought: three guiding principles: the non-contradiction rule, the excluded middle, and the identity principle. The study is primarily a conceptual analysis that proceeded by library study, employing the typical philosophical argumentation approach of evaluation, analysis, synthesis, reflection, and philosophical speculation. By highlighting the weaknesses of Harding's epistemology and suggesting possible remedies, this study contributes to a broader debate on the potential limitations of epistemology. It offers insights into developing more robust epistemological frameworks that promote social justice and inclusivity in knowledge inquiries, practices, and justification.
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